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1. Introduction  
 
After three post independence decades of insufficient progress, India grew at 6% per 
annum from 1980 to 2002 and at 7,6% from 2002 through 2007. Its rising path has been 
quite unique: rather than exporting labor intensive, low-priced manufactured goods, 
India relied on its domestic market more than on exports, consumption more than 
investment, services more than industry and high-tech more than low-skilled 
manufacturing. Moreover, 30-40% of GDP growth depends on rising productivity rather 
than to increases in the amount of capital or labor. Bosworth and Collins (2007) 
document that, over the period 1993-2004, 2.3% of the growth (out of a total of 6.5%) 
was accounted for by productivity changes. This suggests that India’s reforms processes 
has been able to obtain results in terms of better incentives and competition, inducing 
improvements in productivity. 
As for Indian banking, it has lived three phases, so far. The first one (before 1969), was 
dominated by private ownership. The government nationalized most banks in 1969 and 
in 1980, and imposed quantitative targets and tight administrative constraints. Financial 
liberalization started in 1992, with reforms aimed at increasing stability and 
competitiveness. India is now on track to create a modern financial system. Skeptics, 
though, point to the still high weight of the public sector, the major remaining 
constraints relate to foreign ownership and statutory priority lending and the remaining 
indications of credit exclusion (the words ‘credit’ and ‘advances’ are used 
interchangeably).   
2. From protectionism to liberalization 
Indian growth averaged 3,5% from 1950 to 1980. In this so called ‘Hindu’ growth rate 
period, India adopted an import substitution and infant industry strategy. India pursued 
nationalization in many sectors (including banking), high public investment in 
infrastructure and implemented a centralized planning strategy. Such an approach 
yielded good growth rates during 1951-1964: about 4.3%. Nonetheless, from 1965 to 
1980, growth slowed down significantly (annual GDP growth averaged 2.9%), in part 
due to the failure of the centralized planning strategy, other than to external factors such 
as drought and ‘oil shocks’. The economy had, in fact, become overtly controlled and 
rigid and largely closed to international trade and investment; such a development 
strategy implied that entrepreneurship was heavily constrained. That was no longer 
acceptable in a rapidly globalizing world. 
 
In the early 1980s, India embarked on a path of economic reforms in the so-called 
Bharatiya (meaning, Indian) growth period. Modest liberal reforms – especially 
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lowering marginal tax rates and tariffs and providing some leeway to manufacturers – 
revived average growth to 5.6%. A pro-active attitude towards the private sector 
strongly contributed to an improvement in the scenario. Nonetheless, by the start of the 
1990s, profligateness brought India to the brink of a balance of payments crisis with a 
realistic threat of sovereign default; fiscal deficits increased significantly, while 
inflation crept up to uncomfortable levels. These developments triggered wide-ranging 
pro-liberalization reforms and much more attention to fiscal health. All such reforms 
laid the groundwork for increasingly high growth rates, averaging 6,2% in 1993-2000 
and over 7,5% since 2003.  
 
Financial sector reform was central. Introduction of some operational autonomy in state-
owned banks, entry of new private and of a greater number of foreign banks, and 
(limited) permission for foreign investment in banking were some of the major 
measures. Besides, prudential regulation was strengthened, in line with international 
best practices. The capital market has been revived with policy reforms, financial 
infrastructure innovation and an improved payment and settlement architecture. Among 
major interventions, we signal the 1992 abolition of the Controller of Capital Issues 
(CCI), which was in charge of both controlling the issuance of securities and 
administering their price; such reform  liberalized the issuing of corporate bonds and the 
subsequent demutualization of the stock exchange.  
3. The bank nationalization period 
After independence, national savings were low and supplied mainly by households. The 
banking sector was invested of a very important intermediation role. By 1951, there 
were 566 banks in India. Nonetheless, many rural and semi-urban areas were not well 
serviced. Also, the bulk of credit was directed towards large corporates, at the expense 
of the agricultural and SMEs. The All-India Rural Credit Survey Committee reported 
that out of the total borrowings of farmers of about INR 7.5bn, commercial banks 
provided less than 1%, while money lenders accounted for an overwhelming 70%.  
 
Table 1: Progress of commercial banking 
 June 1969 Dec 1980 March 1991 March 2006 March 2007 
No. of commercial banks 73 154 272 222 183 
No. of bank offices in India 8262 34594 60570 71685 73836 
Population/bank office (‘000s) 64 16 14 16 16 
Deposits (INR bn) 46.5 404.4 2011.9 21090.5 26083.1 
Per capita deposit (INR) 88 738 2368 19130 23382 
Credit (INR bn) 35.9 250.8 1218.7 15070.8 19289 
Per capita credit (INR) 68 457 1434 13869 17541 
Total asset (INR bn) 68.4 710.8 3275.2 27858.6 34634.1 
Asset/GDP 0.18 0.59 0.58 0.86 0.93 
Source: Reserve Bank of India, Annual Report, Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India and 
Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India, Various Issues 
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Such features were not in sync with the national objective of achieving equitable 
allocation of credit. Therefore, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) was envisaged to 
promote credit, with special attention to agriculture. Moreover, since 1967 a Bill 
imposed extensive social control over banks and banking policy. Banks were required to 
implement the government's objectives of improving banking access of rural areas and 
SMEs. These developments culminated in a two-stage bank nationalisation process, in 
1969 and in 1980, aimed at ensuring that financial intermediaries fully met the credit 
demands according to national priorities. In fact, political economy considerations and 
borrowers’ needs gained primacy over the financial viability of the banking sector. Such 
choices were supported by an intensified public control over the financial system 
through various measures such as active mobilisation of savings through bank-
dominated network, directed lending, interest rate regulation and the like.  
 
Two important facets of banking during the post-nationalization period deserve 
mention. The first was ‘priority sector lending’: both the State Bank of India, and the 
nationalised banks and private banks were required to lend at least a fixed percentage of 
credit to agriculture and small-scale industry (RBI, 1983). Secondly, the branch 
licensing policy entailed banks to open four branches in unbanked locations for every 
branch opened elsewhere. Such policy increased the scope of banking in India to a scale 
unique to its level of development: by 2000, India had over 60,000 bank branches, 
spanning every district across the country (Table 1). Burgess and Pande (2005) showed 
that the re-distributive nature of branch expansion led to a substantial decline in rural 
poverty.  
4. The Banking reforms 
The unprecedented balance-of-payments crisis of the early 1990s, coupled with limited 
public resources for investment or provision of public services, rapidly brought forth the 
imperatives for financial sector strengthening. It was recognised that the success of the 
economy is contingent on a healthy financial system. India started a banking sector 
reform package in 1992. The thrust of the reforms was to promote a diversified, 
efficient and competitive financial system. Its first phase was guided by the 
recommendations of the Committee on the Financial System which proposed to bring 
about “operational flexibility” and “functional autonomy” so as to enhance “efficiency, 
productivity and profitability” (Government of India, 1991). The second stage of the 
reforms paid more attention towards strengthening the foundations of the banking 
system and make it internationally competitive (Government of India, 1998). 
 
The approach to reforms is based on five principles: cautious and proper sequencing; 
mutually reinforcing measures; complementarities between reforms in banking sector 
and changes in fiscal, external and monetary policies; developing financial 
infrastructure; and developing financial markets. The reforms were carefully sequenced: 
prudential norms and supervisory strengthening were introduced early, followed by 
interest rate deregulation and gradual lowering of statutory preemption, while legal and 
accounting measures were ushered in only when the basic tenets of the reforms were 
already in place. Concurrently, a process of gradualism was pursued along with a 
process of continuous consultation with all stakeholders: such involvement enhanced 
the credibility of policies (Ahluwalia, 2002). Another positive feature has been the 
constant rebalancing of priorities according to evolution of the business environment, 
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and its harmonization with other policies: recognising the inter-linkages, wide-ranging 
reforms were also undertaken in the real sector so that financial intermediation kept 
pace with underlying economic activity. Finally, the reforms were characterized by non-
reversals, taking on board the views of all stakeholders.  
 
At the same time, the weight of the public sector in banking has been reduced. 
Moreover, the ownership base in state-owned banks has been diversified. The 
regulations were amended to enable these banks to raise private capital, not exceeding 
49% of their equity, in order for the government to retain majority shareholding. Equity 
sales in the market aggregating around INR.180bn (US $4.5bn) have been made by 
these banks, with several banks making subsequent follow-on offerings. Over the period 
1993-2007, as many as 20 state-owned banks have accessed the capital market. At 
present, state-owned banks with 100% government ownership comprise only around 
10% of commercial bank assets compared to around 90% at the beginning of reforms.  
A set of progressively tighter micro-prudential measures were instituted, with the 
objective of benchmarking against international best practices. Risk-based capital 
standards was hiked to 9%. Asset classification into doubtful, sub-standard and standard 
assets and related provisioning requirements were strengthened. Moreover, also rules on 
exposure limits for single and group borrowers, accounting rules, and investment 
valuation norms were improved. As part of such effort, the process of regulation and 
supervision has been strengthened with a strategy of on-site inspection and off-site 
surveillance, together with greater accountability of external auditors. In such a context, 
the RBI has been focusing on ensuring 'fit and proper' owners and directors of the bank 
(banks have been advised to ensure that a nomination committee screens the nominated 
and elected directors) and laying stress on diversified ownership.  
 
As for Basel II, banks will initially adopt Standardized Approach for credit risk and 
Basic Indicator Approach for operational risk. From 2008, capital adequacy levels will 
be determined by a three-track approach. On the first track, commercial banks would be 
required to maintain capital for both credit and operational risks as per Basel II 
framework. The cooperative banks, on the second track, are required to maintain capital 
for credit risk as per Basel I framework and through surrogates for market risk; and the 
regional rural banks, on the third track, have a minimum capital requirement. The 
banking system has also witnessed greater levels of transparency and standards of 
disclosure in order to promote greater market discipline in line with the envisaged Basel 
II Accord.   
 
Institutional arrangement to improve supervision and to ensure integrity of payment and 
settlement systems has been put in place. Key measures include the institution of a 
Board for Financial Supervision (1994) in order to ensure an integrated approach to 
supervision. In order to address the issue of regulatory gaps and overlaps across major 
regulatory authorities, a High Level Co-ordination Committee on Financial and Capital 
Markets has been operational since 1999.  
 
The legal infrastructure has also been strengthened. For instance, corporate debt 
restructuring process has been improved. Compromise settlements have been introduced 
to provide an opportunity to borrowers for settlement of their outstanding dues. These 
have been supplemented by Debt Recovery Tribunals (DRTs) and Lok Adalats 
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(people’s court) for settling limited banking disputes. Visaria (2006) reports that the 
establishment of DRTs significantly lowered loan delinquency. More recently, the 
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security 
Interest Act (2002) has allowed secured creditors to enforce their interests and take 
possess of secured assets, in order to improve loan-recovery rates. The Credit 
Information Companies (Regulation) Act (2004) is expected to make available credit 
histories of both individuals and small businesses, lower transactions costs and enhance 
the quality of credit decision making.  
 
The net impact of these policy changes is getting reflected in the financial performance 
of banks (Table 2). Overall, efficiency and productivity has been improved by 
enhancing competition (Prasad and Ghosh, 2005). Moreover, Das and Ghosh (2006) 
report significant improvements in the performance of state-owned banks, post 
liberalization and a gradual convergence in their performance with foreign-owned and 
new private peers. The overall capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of commercial banks, 
which was 10,4% in 1996-97 has since trended upwards to reach 12,3% in 2006-07. 
Likewise, improved recovery management and better risk assessment, has resulted in a 
steady decline in the NPLs ratio of banks, from 15,7% in the mid-1990s to 2.7% in 
2006-07. Such figures compare favorably with other emerging markets.  
 
Table 2: Performance indicators of commercial banks (as % of total asset) 
 1980-91 1992-96 1997-01 2001-02 2002-03 2005-06 2006-07
Operating expense 2.53 2.74 2.64 2.19 2.24 2.11 1.97
Spread 1.90 2.94 2.87 2.57 2.77 2.78 2.78
Net Profit 0.15 -0.16 0.61 0.75 1.01 0.88 0.90
Source: Reserve Bank of India, Annual Report, Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India and 
Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India, Various Issues 
 
5. The structure of the Indian banking system  
India's financial system is broadly serviced by two major groups of intermediaries: 
banks (commercial and co-operative, Table 3) and financial institutions, which includes 
development banks and the broadly defined non-bank financial institutions. The focus 
of this paragraph is on commercial banks which account for over 85% of banking 
assets. As of March 2006, there were 222 scheduled commercial banks, 133 of which 
were regional rural institutions. Indian law makes no distinction between universal and 
strictly commercial banks and most banks operate as universal banks.  
 
India's scheduled commercial banks are the major depository institutions and mobilize 
most of the country's savings. They traditionally provide short-term credit to meet the 
working-capital needs of enterprises. Since deregulation, however, many of the larger 
banks have begun to target the medium-to-long-term corporate lending, the 
infrastructure debt market, and the retail sector. In the absence of a developed domestic 
long-term debt market (outstanding domestic and international debt issues account for 
less than 3% of GDP in 2005), financial institutions maintain a specialist role in meeting 
corporates’ long-term funding requirements. Over the past several years, the distinction 
between commercial banks and financial institutions has, anyway, weakened. 
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Table 3: Structure of the Indian banking system  
Institution No. of 
Institutions
Total Asset 
(INR.bn)
% of  total 
asset
Banking Sector  (1 + 2)  3117 38912 100.00
1. Commercial banks ( a + b) 191 34658 89.07
       (a)  Scheduled commercial banks 187 34653 89.06
                 State Bank of India and 
Nationalised banks 
28 23361 60.04
                 Private sector banks 26 7454 19.16
                 Foreign banks 29 2780 7.14
                 Regional rural banks 96 1058 2.72
(b) Local Area Banks 4 5 0.01
2. Cooperative banks   2926 4254 10.93
Figures as at end-March 2007 
Source: Reserve Bank of India, Annual Report, Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India and 
Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India, Various Issues 
 
Private banks account for 19,2% of total assets and over a fifth of total advances. Even 
before 1991, a few private banks have been operating in India: the 20 so-called 'old 
private banks’ escaped nationalization. The new private banks, on the other hand, 
benefited from the lack of burdensome administrative and branch networks, and have 
been able to establish a small but growing foothold in the market, leveraging on 
information technology and communications networking and focusing on few reliable 
high-net-worth companies and. 
 
Foreign banks play a small but innovative role in India. At end June 2007, 29 foreign 
banks with 268 branches from over 25 countries were operating in India (Table 4). 
They account for about 7% of total commercial banking sector asset. Another 30-odd 
foreign banks had representative offices. India has traditionally been quite open to 
foreign banks, even if less to foreign acquisition of Indian banks. There is no restriction 
on the licensing of new foreign banks in India, although licensing may be restricted if 
the foreign banks' market share exceeds 15% of the banking system. So far, foreign 
banks are allowed to either open up branches or set up wholly owned subsidiaries. 
Foreign banks are subject to the same prudential requirements as their domestic 
counterparts.  
 
Table 4: Foreign banks in India 
Country  Number of banks Branches in India 
Belgium 1 1 
Canada 1 5 
France 3 15 
Germany 1 8 
Hong Kong 1 48 
Japan 2 5 
Netherlands 1 28 
Singapore 1 2 
UK 2 84 
USA 4 52 
Others 12 20 
Source: Reserve Bank of India, Annual Report, Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India and 
Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India, Various Issues 
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The traditional contribution of foreign banks has been to meet the banking needs of 
foreign companies operating in the country and they are dominant in the forex market 
and in the derivatives market. In fact, traditionally, foreign banks focused on cross-
border transactions involving trade finance with the larger Indian corporates. Recently, 
some of them have successfully tapped the middle-class and personal-banking markets. 
Their competitive advantage is based on their larger range of products and better 
standards of service. The new Indian private-sector banks, however, pose a threat for 
foreign banks. As the larger domestic commercial banks also become more aggressive, 
foreign banks will increasingly try to leverage their international networks to stay 
competitive. At the same time, several foreign banks have rationalized their Indian 
operations.  
 
As for foreign ownership of Indian banks, the restriction is tighter: total foreign 
ownership in a private-sector bank cannot exceed 74% of the paid-up capital1, while in 
state-owned banks the FDI limit remains 20%. Moreover, mergers and acquisitions of 
Indian banks are subject to RBI approval and no individual foreign bank can own more 
than 5% of a domestic bank without RBI approval. Furthermore, a 10% cap on foreign 
investors voting rights exists at present.  
 
Efforts have been initiated by the Government and the RBI to iron out various legal 
impediments inherent in the process of cross-border M&A.In particular, in the Union 
Budget Speech 2005-06, it was announced that RBI had prepared a two-phase roadmap 
for removing significant barriers to entry of new foreign players:  
? Since March 2005, foreign banks could either choose to operate through branches or 
set up a 100% wholly owned subsidiary (WOS) or convert their existing branches to 
WOS status. The WOS will be treated on par with the existing branches of foreign 
banks for branch expansion. To allow Indian banks sufficient time to prepare for 
global competition, foreign banks M&A will be permitted only in private-sector 
banks identified for restructuring by the RBI. 
? The second phase will start from April 2009. The removal of limitations on the 
operations of the WOSs and treating them on par with domestic banks will be 
designed and implemented after reviewing the experience with Phase I and 
consultations with all existing stakeholders. After a minimum period of operation, 
the WOSs of foreign banks will be allowed to list and dilute their stake so that at 
least 26% of the paid-up capital of the WOS is held by resident Indians. After a 
review is made, foreign banks may be permitted, subject to regulatory approvals and 
such conditions as may be prescribed, to enter into M&A transactions with any 
private-sector bank in India subject to the overall investment limit of 74% and the 
one mode presence limit. 
 
So far, in several new private banks, the extent of foreign ownership is over 50%; these 
banks account for roughly half of the total assets of domestic private banks. Even in 
several public-sector-owned banks, the extent of foreign ownership within the private 
holding is close to that of domestic private holding. Moreover, there is selected 
evidence of foreign banks owning significant shares of Indian private banks. For 
instance, Bank Muscat International (Oman) owns 18,64% of Centurion Bank of 
Punjab, Rabobank International Holdings owns 20% of Yes Bank, ING owns 44% of 
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ING Vsysa Bank, ABN AMRO Bank was holding 1.4% of IndusInd Bank and foreign 
institutional investors hold just over 20% of the shares of Kotak Mahindra Bank.  
 
Notwithstanding such evidence, several issues are still hampering a broader consensus 
over larger foreign presence in the banking sector: a) a concern about “cherry-picking” 
practices of foreign banks, which could leave domestic banks saddled with less 
creditworthy customers; b) the fact that the supervision of the more sophisticated 
activities of foreign banks entails a continuous challenge for regulators; c) doubts on 
whether depositors in foreign banks would be entitled to receive the same degree of 
protection as depositors in domestic banks; d) fears that the host country should extend 
the ‘lender of last resort’ umbrella to foreign banks; e) concerns about the still limited 
dimension and profitability of many Indian banks, which might make them exposed to 
hostile foreign takeovers.  
 
6. Financial deepening and related issues 
 
As the economy begins to grow rapidly and an increasing number of people migrate out 
of the poverty levels, the banking system will have to intermediate large amounts of 
funds than at present. The ratio of bank asset to GDP, loans and deposit to GDP and 
loans to deposits, although increasing in recent times, is still much lower than in other 
comparable bank-based economies, which suggests significant scope for financial 
deepening. In such a changed scenario, banks would need to harness modern delivery 
mechanisms that economize on transactions costs and provide better access to the 
presently under-served customers. This will call for devising innovative channels for 
credit delivery coupled with risk-related pricing of products and services. The role of 
prudent risk management, in such a situation, can hardly be over-emphasized.  
 
It is also increasingly recognized that large segments of the rural population face 
‘financial exclusion’ and continue their traditional dependence on the informal sector. 
Cross-country data for 99 countries in 2003-04 reported by Beck et al. (2007) indicates 
that, India ranked 24th in terms of geographic branch penetration (number of branches 
per 1000 sq. kms) with a figure of 22.6 and 59th in terms of demographic penetration 
(number of branches per 100000 people) with a figure of 6.3, whereas the highest for 
these indicators were 636.1 (for Singapore) and 95.9 (for Spain), respectively. The 
Government-appointed Committee on Financial Inclusion (Chairman: Dr.C.Rangarajan) 
in its Report in 2008 notes that, 45.9 million farmer households in the country out of a 
total of 89.3 million households do not access credit, either from institutional or non-
institutional sources. The challenge remains for developing appropriate policies, 
procedures and products that can overcome this difficulty within the bounds of resource 
constraints. Some of the challenges which need to be effectively addressed include lack 
of adequate infrastructure in rural areas, relatively low volumes of transactions, 
comparatively higher transaction costs, and other factors such as the literacy levels of 
target customers.  
 
In order to facilitate a deeper financial system and a wider inclusion, technology 
upgrading of the Indian banking system is crucial. In effect, technology has become the 
key to servicing all customer segments – offering convenience to the retail customer and 
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operating efficiencies to corporates and government clients. Moreover, the increasing 
sophistication, flexibility and complexity of products and servicing offerings makes the 
effective use of technology critical for managing the risks associated with banking 
business. However, the ‘technological penetration’ in India has been quite modest: the 
percentage of ‘computer literate’ employees as ratio of total staff in 2000 was around 
20% in public sector banks compared with 100 per cent in new private and around 90 
per cent in foreign banks (RBI, 2002). The challenge, therefore, remains three fold: 
acquiring the ‘right’ technology, deploying it optimally and remaining cost-effective 
whilst delivering sustainable returns to shareholders. In effect, ‘managing’ technology 
to achieve and maintain high service and efficiency standards so as to reap the 
maximum benefits remains a key challenge.  
 
7. Conclusion 
To sum up, the Indian financial system has undertaken several important steps on the 
road towards a modern and efficient financial system, which can be a positive 
contributor to its economic development. This is in line with the philosophy itself of the 
gradualist Indian financial reforms process. Nonetheless, many steps are to be done, yet. 
Among the many issues, development of a domestic market for corporate debt is 
crucial. Developing a debt market can in turn provide corporates with alternative 
sources of financing and complete the scope of the financial market with positive 
spillover on its resilience from financial crises and ‘’sudden stops’ in financial flows 
from abroad. An easier access of foreign investors in Indian banks (already planned by 
the gradual phasing out of restrictions), and a further relaxation of preemption and 
priority lending could, finally, instill further competition in the market and be important 
tools for completing the modernization of India financial sector.  
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